Threats to the U.S. in Space
Chinese development of OCS weapons that challenges U.S. space security.
Threat assessment brief: Research Essay by Subateeswarran Looganaden
(Awarded First Class)
Background
Space security, a vital policy issue that covers U.S. security, economy, foreign policy, and scientific advancements are on the verge of being compromised. Space is becoming increasingly contested by major global powers such as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and India. Chinese military doctrine acknowledges the importance of outer space for modern warfare & considers employing counter-space technologies to reduce U.S. capabilities (DIA, 2019). China sees space as vital for information dominance and wants to secure economic and military advantage (Clementine et al, 2021). The PRC reorganized its military strategy, formed the PLA’s Strategic Support Force in 2015 and have drastically weaponized space by developing earth & space-based offensive counter-space (OCS) weapons that could destroy, disable, and disrupt U.S. space assets in potential conflicts. (Harrison et al, 2021).
In this struggle for space resources, whichever state that successfully equips itself; dictates space norms and legitimatize the framework for future global space activities hence, it’s crucial for the U.S. to quickly respond to the rising threats of space security by amending its space policy (Potter et al, 2021).
Space threats can be categorized into 4 types of OCS technology; kinetic physical, non-kinetic physical, electronic, and cyber which can result in reversible or non-reversible impacts on space-based assets. It can track or monitor satellite transmissions, compromise electronics, or physically impact space infrastructures (Garino et al, 2009). Due to technological advancements, developments of space-based capabilities have become much simpler and cheaper (Jim Garamone, n.d.). ASAT missiles are commonly developed OCS weapons; it’s easy to verify the target however, it results in significant space debris and isn’t adequately regulated (Amanda Miller, 2021).
U.S. dependencies & policies
The U.S. heavily depends on digitized critical space infrastructures compared to other spacefaring states (Peña et al, 2002). U.S. national security and economic prosperity are inextricably linked to space-based assets such as communication, satellite and data transmission systems which provides a wide range of civilian, military, and commercial services (McClintock et al, 2021). The U.S. dependencies on space-based systems lead to the vulnerability that attracts foreign adversaries to utilize counter space weapons technology which in return threatens American space dominance (Tom Wilson, n.d.).
U.S. Space Policy ensures the availability of OCS weapons as the top priority to maintain space superiority and deter China but also, relies on contingency plans to prevent conflicts. It reserves the right to attack any foreign adversaries, and this remains to be inconsistent as there’s no economically logical way to protect American space systems as the technology required to safeguard U.S. space assets are costlier than developing OCS weapons (Bruce, 2008). The U.S. continues cooperating with like-minded partners to establish transparent, long-term sustainable standards of responsible behaviours in peaceful space exploitation and utilization to reduce conflict risks. Moreover, it pursues confidence-building efforts, adopts international policies (UN guidelines) and utilizes U.S. Space Force to deliver defensive or offensive space support to ensure freedom to access and operate in the space system (National space policy, 2020)
International space treaties
Out of five UN space treaties and principles, the Outer-Space Treaty covers notions of what’s permittable in space. The international space regime still provides authority to individual nation-states to regulate space activities; this disrupts stable space governance and security. It doesn’t cover concerns over space debris caused by OCS satellite jammers, fails to provide a legal definition of space debris and it’s unclear on who owns or has the legal authority to remove debris (Hitchens, 2015). Recent referendums and amendments indicate that states should collectively reduce threats in space via norms of behaviours and rules still, these non-binding international agreements wouldn’t guarantee space security as there’s no consensus achieved in specialized IGO bodies such as UNOOSA and UNCOPUOS (Sophie, 2021).
Beijing’s OCS development
China considers U.S. space plans as ploys to monopolize and weaponize space, it aspires to supersede the U.S. in space leadership to win informatized local wars (Zhang, 2008). The CCP emphasises on military-civil fusion development & has heavily invested in OCS. The PLASSF continues to develop and test PRC’s ASAT weapons, ground-based laser/microwave weapons, spoofing/jamming cyber capabilities and robotic grappling-arms technology in low-earth-orbit (LEO) (Rajeswari, 2020 & National Intelligence, 2021). China has conducted non-impact ASAT missiles tests that can disrupt U.S. satellites' effectiveness at GEO and MEO; this causes major security concerns for the allied states who rely on the American security umbrella (Langeland, 2021, Stokes et al, 2020).
Recommendations
The U.S. should lead in developing binding international agreements with leading states within the UN bodies to strengthen the legal framework by forming policies that cover space debris, space weaponization and space governance. The U.S. should abolish ASAT tests that form space debris and aid other states in removing debris in LEO. The national space council must formulate a non-aggressive, effective deterrence strategy against China by reinforcing its efforts via sharing of assessment data with NATO allies and partners (Cahan, 2021). The US must dissuade China by making its market more accessible and engaging in Sino-American joint venture space operations. Congress must regulate IGO bodies that collaborate with Chinese space-military initiatives, increase media coverage to educate the public about space security and provide more funds to analysts to research on Beijing’s OCS progress. DOD must increase funds for Space Force for new technological upgrades to protect defence systems (Meteyer, 2005).
Conclusion
The existing international legislative and frameworks are incompatible with the modern space activities as it’s based on ideational principles such as space — a common heritage of mankind and to be utilized for peaceful purposes. Only recently, after the formation of the U.S. space force, NATO’s space policy recognizes space as a domain of warfare (Peperkamp, 2020). American outer-space policy lacks clear policy objectives in addressing long-term sustainable frameworks. If China resorts to asymmetric methods, U.S. space security will be compromised. These suggested recommendations may reduce U.S. space vulnerability, counter foreign aggressions, establish international cooperation and secure American interests.
Full research including references provided upon request: subawarran@gmail.com
