Is the US hegemony in the Asia/Indo-Pacific tested by China’s Grand Strategy?
Sino-U.S. contestation over regional hegemony is a zero-sum game
Gramsci’s notion of Hegemony & Hegemonic Stability Theory states that a hegemon’s capacity is the ability to exercise power, impose ideas, dictate norms, and achieve its own goals in the international system by coercing, compelling & convincing other states with consent; it finds that the international system is more stable when its unipolar and will have the most open economic order (Kim, 2019). Mearsheimer’s offensive realism claims that a hegemon is a state that uses its great economic and militarily capabilities to dominate other states for survival in an anarchial system hence, the natural thing for China to do would be to position itself as regional hegemon with no competitors or challengers to its power in its own backyard to change the balance of power in the international system (Mearsheimer, 2010). Meanwhile, Waltz’s defensive realism assumes that China will challenge American hegemony if it’s able to deliver its promises, maintain legitimacy and continue its economic progression (Chen, 2013).
The PRC’s grand strategy is viewed by the West as a continues pursuit of regional hegemony due to its need to expand its sphere of influence oversees as an economic superpower in the Asia-Pacific region. The US has shifted strategies from “pivoting” and “rebalancing” China to acknowledging it as “strategic competitor” and “revisionist power” that seeks to challenge the US & reorder the region by transcending into a hard power military. China’s astonishing economic progression, technological advancements, modernizing military capabilities, soft-power configuration, geo-political aspirations, and assertive posture in foreign policy towards its neighbouring states; does raises queries about its ambitions to replace American hegemony and regain its regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.
Nonetheless, these oversimplified speculations limit the actual understanding of the Asia-Pacific region, China’s hegemony isn’t unilaterally imposed but is something that’s generated due to domestic considerations of other important powers in the region along the potential failure of the US in offering hegemonic stability and to provide international public goods. This essay examines the plausibility of Chinese regional hegemony by considering economics, security, cultural/diplomatic relations of Asia-Pacific states with grand strategies of China & US using IR theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence. The findings assert that a full-scale Chinese hegemony is unlikely due to absence of alternative model of development and conditional engagement of middle powers.
Declining US-Hegemony in Asia-Pacific
Ikenberry finds that American dominance in the region has been largely unchallenged until recently because it offered mutually benefitting trades and relative stability for Asia-Pacific states. He argues that China-US relationship are mutually beneficial and warns that China’s “authority-seeking” & “muscle-flexing” attitude will challenge the liberal world order (Ikenberry & Lim,2017). However, the US hegemony in the regional discourse and institutional framework of Asia Pacific was already declining due to its own change in unilateral/bilateral foreign policies, exacerbated by domestic affairs. The East Asian regionalism idea, organisations such as ASEAN+3 along Chinese regional leadership and economic importance in the region is consolidating a new East Asian regional order by deposing liberal ideas and institutions that entrenches US hegemonic rule. (Beeson, 2006). The durability of American hegemony also depends on the willingness of the US to defend it, volatile populists policies of Trump administration such as disengagement from multilateralism — withdrawal from TPP has forced Asia-Pacific states to modify their strategies and proceed without US leadership.
Grand Strategy of US
The US shifted its foreign policies towards Beijing due to its perceived aggressive revisionism policies in the Indo-pacific region, increasingly popular “China-threat” rhetoric and concerned about China eroding the Western “rules-based order” and contestation of the “Pax Americana” in Asia Pacific (Benjamin,2022). Unlike Obama’s “pivot to Asia” strategy which attempted to confine China and identified China as constructive partner, Trump confronted China with a more assertive stance and labelled China as a threat to US leadership, sovereign security, values, economic & political influence, and interests (Hu, W. 2020). He slammed the PRC for its human rights violations, debt-trap policy via BRI projects, militarization, and illegal claims in the ECS and SCS.
Under Trump’s “whole-of-government” approach, the US strategic vision of Asia-Pacific has been extended to the concept of ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP)” and it has been greatly established in foreign policies of other states such as Australia, India, Japan, and SK. The Indo-Pacific construct now includes the Indian Ocean & Asia Pacific as it recognizes the growing economic interdependent economy in East & South Asia along the strategic interest of China and India. Many states in the region including ASEAN have recognize the Indo-Pacific concept, but China has been reluctant to acknowledge it & continues to refer the region as Asia-Pacific. The PRC has rejected this concept as it finds the Indo-Pacific strategy’s objective is to contain China’s rise.
The US-China trade war raised concerns about modern-day cold war, economic nationalism & de-globalization but it can be perceived as a containment strategy of the US towards China’s plan for “Made in China 2025 and intention to expand as an alternative international supplier of global goods due to its rapid economic progression and technological advancements in the fields of AI, quantum computing, and 5G telecommunications. US puts front the notion that China will be a disruptive free rider that leads to the “Kindleberger trap” due to its potential failure in providing and sustaining international public goods in the international system while exploiting them (Nye, 2017).
Biden’s administration continues the outreach of FOIP to re-establish US leadership; the US depicts China as an aggressive actor and is concerned about the security of allies in Asia Pacific. Biden claims that their objective isn’t to engage in a geopolitical bipolarity with PRC but to form a balance of power/influence in the region that favours interests and goals of the US and its allies. The US emphasizes on the notion of free and open access to the sea and plans to re-order the region by strengthening its regional alliance in the Indo Pacific via ASEAN, APEC, AUKUS and QUAD to avoid challenges or actions of “balancing” from China, North Korea, and Russia. China finds the US led coalitions and initiatives such as FOIP, Quad, Quad +, US-ROK-Japan trilateral alliance as anti-Chinese intended to undermine the rise of PRC.
Grand Strategy of China
Deng Xiaoping’s “24-characters” strategy, “hide & bide” approach and economic reforms have enabled China to rise peacefully within the existing LWO by reaping the benefits of free trade. Following his wisdom, China claims not to challenge the US hegemony but conform to the existing order as it requires continuous trade relations with the West to attain great power status, legitimise its authoritarian rule and ensure its regime survival. It didn’t liberalize as the West had hoped for but, it’s not in the interest of the Chinese to threaten the open economic order. China can be viewed as a “satisfied power” that wouldn’t afford to seek hegemony by counterbalancing coalition against the US and form an alternative model to replace the Liberal Hegemonic Order as it largely is benefitted by the integration in the economic system maintained by the US. As China’s power grows its adherence to Deng’s vision seems to decrease, under Xi Jinping, China’s domestic and foreign ambitions and influence has grown exponentially.
Xi’s grand strategy is to realize China’s civilizational renaissance, the “China dream” which brings power, glory, and economic stability to China peacefully however, the CCP’s influence and clandestine foreign relations strategy towards Asia-Pacific is unclear. China does seek the responsibility to create Chinese-driven ‘Asia-Pacific Dream’ for the progression of China to become a global superpower by 2050 but it can’t be perceived as means to become a hegemon in Asia-Pacific or to establish a Sino-centric tributary system where smaller states obey and consent to China’s orders. Also, PRC often emphasize on the large power difference in terms of economic, military, and technological capacity between the US and China, they claim to recognize US primacy and focused on domestic economic development and regime stability.
Xi recognizes the exhausting Chinese economic model due to declining trade, competitiveness along rising debts and production capacity (Ren, 2016; Wang, 2018). Hence, PRC adopted new changes in geo-economic strategies such as transforming domestic financial system and the OBOR/BRI project to increase China’s economic progression to achieve geopolitical transformations, strategic rebalance of Asia-Pacific and overcome internal struggles. The establishment of multilateral development bank, AIIB along intergovernmental organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), can be perceived as extension of PRC-led alternative hegemonic system, aspirations to become regional economic leader, to resist IPS security pressure and dissatisfaction with the current international economic system (Khong, 2018). Concerns about Chinese revisionism often centres around the Beijing aggressive stance towards Taiwan especially its right to use force to pursue its reunification with Taiwan, however due to recent tensions in the region, Xi vows for peaceful reunification with Taiwan and aims to “de‐securitize” China’s rise and foster cooperation between US & China especially in climate and energy sector.
Economic relations
China is not only increasing its military presence in SEA but also leveraging its economic relationship with Indo-pacific states to reorder the region. Indo-pacific states are mostly formal/strategic US allies & security partners but also biggest trading partners with China, they value economic cooperation more than security ties; the economic dependency on China is continuously increasing as Asia-Pacific states are reliant on China for imports and exports (Heydarian, 2015). China utilizes its political & economic leverage via BRI to gain diplomatic influence to integrate economic and military power & finally achieve strategic leverage in the region. It creates dependency and establish hegemonic norms in the region via coercion or rewarding states that adopt policies favourable to PRC (Miller, 2017). However, perceiving China’s economic influence to affect policy outcomes of Asia-Pacific states is misleading as most states in the region have other trade partners like Japan and aren’t fully reliant on China.
It is attempting to increase diplomacy and trade relations with long-term American allies such as Philippines and Indonesia. By engaging in economic coercion using economic tools sanctions on competitors and challengers of disputed islands; the PRC attempts to penalise South Korea for THAAD implementation and Japan for Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. It also pulls potential partners from other sub-region and divide ASEAN states to prevent cooperation and increase dependency on China. The BRI is seen as a cunning economic tool to gain geo-economic leverage via ‘debt-traps’ however, BRI is a piecemeal project, overestimating PRC ability to control BRI projects & underestimating the capability of partners to reject only leads to unnecessary confusion or concerns.
Security relations
China’s increasing military expenditure, capabilities, coercive policies, and militarization challenges American primacy in Asia-Pacific and is seen as provocative attempt to change the regional status quo. China has developed new overseas military bases such as SIGNIT facility and Ream naval base in Myanmar and Cambodia respectively by reclaiming land using BRI corridors. Also, it engages in coercive bilateral diplomacy & threats of force with SEA states to manage its maritime disputes and establish historical claims over EEZ in SCS. The US couldn’t stop China from militarizing the region with artificial islands due to PRC’s fait accompli strategies such a salami slicing, cabbage strategy, limited-probe, and controlled-pressure options in SCS and ECS. China’s economic rise challenges its non-intervention policies, it claims that the chain of naval bases built in Indian Ocean and economic overland corridors built in Pakistan as part of its Maritime Silk Route initiative and will be utilized by the PLA navy to protect trade routes and Chinese workers. Sino-pessimist find that China’s String of Pearls strategy acts as a mechanism to strengthen Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region (Robert & Manjeet 2017, David, 2017).
China’s noticeable shift to assertive maritime policies in the Asia-pacific is influenced by the declining hegemonic status of the US and the increasing popularity of the successful “Chinese model” in the aftermath of 2008 recession (Beeson, Crawford, 2022). However, the US retaliates by carrying out surveillance in China’s ADIZ, establish new military partnerships & signed treaties with Philippines & Japan to ensure regional distribution of power. Also, the US still acts as the dominant security provider in the region due to its high military spending & increased security cooperation with allies in East Asia that have territorial disputes with China. Also, PRC may have grown to become a major exporter of weaponry but most Asia-Pacific states prefer & maintain arms trade with the US.
Cultural/Political relations
PRC also emphasizes on cultural and “civilizational” ties, it has strengthened its “soft power” and “cultural diplomacy” in the region. China donated 2 million doses of vaccines and supplied about 62% of its global vaccines to SEA states in 2021; analysts find that China’s “Vaccine diplomacy” is an attempt to replace US leadership by projecting soft power (Gilani 2021). Unlike China’s political influence in Africa, in the Indo-Pacific region it may seem that foreign policies of most states align with PRC rather than US based on UNGA voting trends. However, the voting patterns alone can’t be used as an indicator to illustrate China’s rising political influence and America’s declining hegemony due to complex voting practices and processes. Japan and South Korea who benefit from American nuclear security umbrella and trade relations tend to lean towards the US in the international institutions however the same couldn’t be said for China’s strategic partners in the region because Indonesia, Singapore and Cambodia may have the highest pro-China voting records but only Cambodia is a strategic ally (Brewster, 2017).
Beyond Thucydides Trap
Graham Allison’s Thucydides trap & Power transition theory predicts that war is inevitable in bipolar contest, when rising power like China challenges the incumbent hegemon, allies of US would accumulate disproportionate power to maintain order to counter the challenger, and this likely would lead to war. Nonetheless, this framework shouldn’t be used to understand US-Sino relationship in Asia-Pacific due to its inter-connected economies, possession of nuclear weapons and prevalent status quo alliance (Hanania, 2021). Moreover, role of middle powers is often under looked by realists and constructivists who often emphasize on military power, material capabilities, economic growth, political & cultural influence. The domestic political legitimation and change in foreign policies of small states / middle powers such as Korea, Japan Asean states along India in the Asia pacific determines the plausibility of multipolarity in the region. For instance, PRC’s aggressive policies and US FOIP have pushed Singapore’s and Vietnam’s foreign relations much closer to US whilst Philippines moved away from US security cooperation for economic relations with China. Most states including strategic allies of US have adopted hedging strategies to balance economic relations with China and security with China or US to protect their own national interests and autonomy.
Despite China’s increasingly popular “Beijing consensus model” and rapid growth of material capabilities the US-led hegemonic order will remain, as it resonates more towards ideologies and values of Asia-Pacific states. PRC wants a multipolar world & is attempting for at-least “partial hegemony” as it continues reassurance policy towards Asia-Pacific states to lure them to their sides however, with unreliable and opportunistic allies like North Korea, Pakistan, Laos and Cambodia, a full-scale Chinese hegemonic order is unlikely. The interconnected complex international system compels US & China to cooperate & maintain balance of power (Zhao, 2015); neither the US nor China can be the single dominant power in Asia Pacific, regional dominance isn’t a viable option for China and US containment strategy isn’t realistic. Sino-U.S. contestation over regional hegemony may end up into prisoner’s dilemma situation or a zero-sum game, every state in the region will have to choose sides and deal with negative repercussions; hence, both states must work together and maintain a delicate balance of power via hedging & tit-for-tat strategy.
