China’s economic ties with Africa reinforces its position as an emerging global power

Research Essay by Subateeswarran Looganaden

Introduction

Under Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 Open-Door Policy, the PRC reformed its economic policy by adopting an export-oriented model to maximize economic prosperity; eventually, the once backward agrarian economy turned into a global economic powerhouse (Yun Sun, 2014). China had been pumping its reserve currency in building a tricontinental economic infrastructure known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — Xi Jinping’s hallmark long-term economic policy & investment strategy (Norris, 2021). China’s strategic investments in Africa reinforces its position as an emerging global power; its interests in Africa doesn’t just encompass natural resources, markets and trades but also issues of geopolitical interests, economic dependence, political influence, security, diplomacy, and soft power (Campbell,2008).

Political support

The strengthening of Sino-African relations provides strategical political support for China; it leverages its economic relationship to diplomatically pursue its geopolitical aspirations in international organizations, especially in the context of ROC & Hong Kong. China understands the importance and relies on Africa’s regional voting bloc; the continent provides 54 votes in the UN and have influenced voting outcomes on multiple occasions. Thanks to the support of African bloc, Taiwan was expelled, and PRC was recognized in the UNGA 1971; today most African states except Eswatini have denounced Taiwan and support Beijing’s one China policy. Africa supported China to undermine 11 human rights reports against it in UNHRC: including its genocide in Xinjiang and human rights violation in Tibet (Taylor, 2009). Loans, aids and “no-string attached free gifts” have an underlying political agenda as African states are more dependent on China (Peter, 2021, EP,2021).

Security Interests

China’s economic involvement is indirectly influencing it to abandon its non-interference principle especially in the case of acquisition of a military base in Djibouti and supplying military supplies to Sudanese government to bolster the UN peace mission. China’s secured approval and support for its military base by justifying the protection of Chinese BRI assets and Chinese nationals. Djiboutian debt alleviation comes with compromises; hence, China can increase its military deployment also, with economic influence it may use Africa as its test ground for overseas military ambitions.

Cultural Influence

China claims it doesn’t wish for cultural or political hegemony; however, it does promote its culture, language, values, and skills via powerful soft power tools such as Confucius Institutes, media, and academic institutions in Africa. The neo-colonial agenda is observed here by the attempt of establishing “Chinese-African friendship” image and cultural assimilation of African people by offering mandarin language in universities, broadcasting Chinese business news media, building free university library and scholarships for students. Cultural or student exchange programs along trainings for government officials, train drivers, farmers and factory workers are carried out to establish soft power influence (David,2019).

Economic Support

The PRC’s expanding middle class, fast-growing domestic economy demands continuous supply of raw materials, export markets and natural resources to fuel its manufacturing sector. The CCP already faces many internal structural problems, and its legitimacy lies heavily on continuous economic prosperity (Friedberg, 2018). China can’t afford issues such as supply disruptions, shortages, sanctions may lead to unemployment, political instability, and social unrest. China’s BRI is an ideological tool to maintain China’s domestic stability also, it’s very much dependent on international trade with Africa because it needs raw materials such as, copper, cobalt, iron, and uranium along long-term energy supplies particularly, oil and gas that’s not sanctioned by other great power. Africa’s growing region, economy and consumer class provides great market potential for China to sell Chinese products manufactured by its companies in China or Africa (U.S. GOV, 2019).

Growth opportunities offered by emerging markets and cheap labour resulted from population growth in African states can sustain PRC’s industrialization (Dzekashu et al 2021, Maverick, 2020). China’s investment in infrastructure and development via (BRI) is very much welcomed in developing states of Africa as it helped spur infrastructure development and economic growth in Africa. The China-Africa Development Fund provides aid and financing for Chinese companies (James & Li, 2021). PRC’s state-owned banks — China Development Bank and China EXIM Bank tend to renegotiate sovereign loans bilaterally and without transparency. They provide more fundings to African developing states than the IMF & World Bank but its contingent to utilization of Chinese techs, labour, and expertise to maximize Chinese foreign exports.

Sino-African economic relations

Sino-optimists view Chinese engagement in Africa as a great opportunity, partnership, and solidarity; China is the African continent’s biggest source of FDI, major aid donor, leading bilateral lender, largest trading, and long-established diplomatic partner. From 2000–2020, PRC has provided 153 million dollars for infrastructure development. Sino-pessimist find that China exhibits itself as a force that empowers the African region against the neo-colonial west while it itself carries out neo-colonial practices with its unbridled exploitation of African resources (OECD, 2021.). Many African elites prefer Chinese investments and loans compared to Western economic institutions like as IMF and world bank because they come with preconditions and preaching of good governance; also, western bodies don’t invest in high-risk projects in remote regions in Africa (Hanauer, et al, 2014). For an example, the World Bank offered Nigeria, 5 million dollars for railway project, while China provided 9 billion without any expectations to reform. However, Western banks provides 40.8% of contracts to recipient states, while China only gives 7.6%. Sino-sceptics oversimply China’s relationship with Africa however, it’s much more complex due to economic interdependence (Aydin et al, 2015, Thierry,2021).

Debt-Trap Policy

China’s economic presence in Africa has led to many debates and queries as its approach to investment is unorthodox compared to western financial development aid. Due to the lack of transparency of BRI contracts and mounting debts of politically and economically unstable African states, global concerns, and scepticism regarding China’s economic agenda in Africa has been rising. The BRI is seen as cunning economic statecraft that’s designed to extend China’s strategic or military reach; by luring poor states into accepting ridiculous amount of loans to develop infrastructures and seize sovereign assets when they can’t pay back. However, China cannot dictate unilaterally what is built via BRI as its a ‘bottom-up’, case-by-case basis, piecemeal economic project that’s heavily recipient-driven. China has been often accused of its alleged usage of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ however, recipient states are equally responsible for poorly conceived development projects (Liang, 2007, Deborah,2019).

Ideological interest

China engages with Africa multilaterally via Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to strengthen bilateral diplomatic; it uses a rhetoric that stresses on sovereignty-based political equality, ‘African solutions to African problems’ mutual non-interference in internal affairs. FOCAC discusses specific issues such as foreign aid, cancellation of debts, implementation of mega construction projects, trade concessions, Chinese Special Economic Zones, student & cultural exchange. Its embedded in the ideological framework of South-South “win-win” Cooperation, shared experience of being an emerging developing state and past victim of colonial rule to distinguish itself from the west.

Conclusion

The Sino-African relationship can be described in Gramsci words as “the old is dying nevertheless, the new is yet to be born”; since China’s economic engagement with Africa is set to further global influence, resist Western criticism of China’s foreign and domestic policies, and to replace the Washington Consensus’ with Beijing Consensus model (Lee et al, 2020, Osman, 2017, Jorg, 2019, Rayna, 2015, Nancy, et al, 2019.).

Full research including references provided upon request: subawarran@gmail.com