China-North Korea tensions
Dilemma of economic dependence, regime stability and strategic security influence. China’s 4-D Chess game !!
It is simplistic to assume that China and DPRK’s relationship, one that was forged by blood during the Korean war, with similar political culture and elements of communist traditions would remain the same. The DPRK regime and the PRC need each other for regime survival and political support however, the leverage China has and DPRK’s dependence have shifted vastly due to geopolitical and economical changes in the global system. They do have close ties as they did in the past nonetheless, their bilateral relationship has become deteriorated, ambiguous, and critical recently. Each state looks after its own national interests and quite frequently their interests in certain matters does not align well, as DPRK’s core interest, its regime survival overlaps with PRC’s intention of maintaining regional stability and hegemony. From the PRC’s point-of-view, most East-Asian states such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, and Philippines have economic relations with China but every state except the DPRK has friendly security ties with the US not China. Hence, it is logical why China would seek interest in North Korean affairs; China values DPRK for geo-economic, political, and strategic security influence.
As the south traditionally relies on US, Beijing wants North Korea to rely on it and seeks to keep it as a buffer zone to increase its security/strategic influence against the US and to maintain power-balance in the region. North Korea is heavily economically dependent on China as 90% of its trade and imports comes from China. It considers the PRC as its most valuable and important partner, however, seeks to reduce this overdependence on China. Nevertheless, DPRK now has become an unreliable and unpredictable ally for PRC. This is caused due to its provocative nuclear program developments under Kim Jong Un that are aimed at US, SK & Japan. PRC has grown frustrated with DPRK as an ally as it ignored China’s advice to stop provocations and demands to abandon its testing and development of nuclear and ballistic missile. This puts PRC in an unfavourable position and this love-hate relationship prevents Beijing from playing a decisive role in bringing sustainable solution that maintains stability in the region however, this author finds that PRC prefers to maintain the status-quo rather than major shifts due to fear of radical changes that may lead to instability in the region.
North Korea claims that their nuclear arsenal’s purpose is to establish balance of power with the U.S and deter aggressive hostile forces with nukes that challenges its sovereignty. China views DPRK’s nuclear stance as an insurance policy against American regime change initiatives and doesn’t see it as threat to their own sovereign security however, DPRK’s nuclear activities sometimes coincide with PRC’s high-profile political events. PRC intends for denuclearisation as the DPRK’s possession of nukes undermines the advantage of nuclear P5. China halted oil exports to DPRK to pressure their participation in negotiations of denuclearization to maintain its overall international position however, tourism, smuggling, covid aid, illegal, and informal trade from China to DPRK continues to increase. China attempted to resume the six-party talks to discuss the End of War declaration and advocates for multilateral negotiations and bilateral talks with DRPK to maintain stability of the regime and denuclearization but, Kim shows no interests as of now. Despite increasing Chinese sanctions and change in tone with DPRK, it does not place any regime-challenging pressure on the state.
The expectations, pacifying initiatives, and role played by China in the context of North Korea’s nuclear disarmament has been overly exaggerated. The West tend to think that it is in the interest of China to resolve the uncertain nuclear situation in the region and dispute between North and South Korea. China cannot resolve this situation; it can provide own security assurance and sanction relief for DPRK, but it cannot fulfil demands of North Korea from the US and South Korea such as for halting security cooperation, removal of US, EU, UN sanctions, targeted financial measures against DPRK, no actions taken in UN Commission inquiry on DPRK human rights abuses, removal of Joint US-Korea military exercises and US, USFK & UNC troops in SK/NK borders. There are limits on the pressure China can exert on DPRK and further pressuring it will only reduce its ability in influencing DPRK’s policies.
Recently, Kim’s sister has threatened to nuke the south if it attempts to opt for pre-emptive strikes and the US is unwilling to relief sanctions in-exchange of limited withdrawal of nuclear arsenals. The author finds that if DPRK succumbs to American denuclearization negotiations, PRC would act as the mediator to support DPRK to avoid immediate and full denuclearization by working on capping of nuclear arsenals and limiting proliferations first, as its concerned about the regime collapse. Beijing uses its political and diplomatic influence to prevent instability in DPRK, it wants stable Korean trade partners; even recently, the PRC vetoed UN sanctions on DPRK and has undermine US attempts of pressure-based tactics to denuclearise. Beijing is not looking to “abandon” North Korea and urges the international committees not to put strong pressure on Pyongyang due to the risk of aggravating the current situation which may lead to war caused by fear of causing collapsing regime leadership. However, China has expressed that the PLA wouldn’t be involved if a war erupts in the Korean peninsula even if the regime falls as, it isn’t in PRC’s interests and it has warned about unnecessary provocations, hence preventing the fall of Kim’s regime is most crucial for PRC.
PRC doesn’t want the reunification of both Koreas as it will most likely result in absorption of DPRK into much economically stronger South Korea; the newly formed united Korean neighbour state might be belligerent or a democratic (US) friendly state. The collapse of DPRK may lead to many securities dilemma for China, there will be more stationing of US troops near Chinese Korean borders, THAAD will be continued, and the threat of economic migrants flooding into China will increase. DPRK doesn’t always appreciate the PRC’s economic statecraft due overdependence, but it continues to emulate the China model for development. The PRC provides support to develop and stabilize it by investing in SEZ and luring private Chinese companies however, it wishes to maintain the power relations and ensure dependency. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions together with relative economic growth with Chinese model shows the limits of PRC’s influence in this context. Kim’s concern over regime stability diminishes chances of liberalization via open trade reforms hence the Chinese may hope for a rising middle-class to stir a bottom-up democratic transition in the long-term that also perceives China as an ally and seek protectionist policy to protect national interests.
China wants to maintain the insecurity and stranglehold over DPRK, after recent nuclear tests due to transregional threat, China have been more coercive against DPRK. PRC also uses nuclear situation as a long-term confrontation strategy to keep US distracted from its ambitions and developments, it focuses on DPRK’s regime survival whilst US wants to contain China by destabilizing its formal ally. Xi wants to make sure PRC’s role as influential intermediator and relevance as great power in bringing sustainable solutions in relation to DPRK to manage ties with US. The status quo suits China’s interest but due to shifting dynamics and case-specific situations, there’s no stationary position for DPRK and China will remain ambivalent to protect its core interests. The survival of DPRK regime despite multiple isolationist economic sanctions and global economic shifts may motivate it to continue to test and develop nukes for the survival of its regime; PRC may dislike Kim’s policies, but the stability of the regime and the region is PRC’s topmost concern.
